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Abstract
We study the diffusion of a true and a false message (the rumor)
in a social network. Upon hearing a message, individuals may believe
it, disbelieve it, or debunk it through costly verification. Whenever
the truth survives in steady state, so does the rumor. Online social
communication exacerbates relative rumor prevalence as long as it
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successful policies in the fight against rumors increase individuals’
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1 Introduction
Information often diffuses via communication between friends or social ac-
quaintances. However, people transmit not only correct information, but also
rumors, that is, false or imprecise information.
The virality of these rumors shapes public debates, sometimes involving
significant personal and social costs. Take, as an example, the link between
HIV and AIDS. Policies inspired by conspiracy theories denying this link are
being held responsible for around 350, 000 deaths in South Africa between
2000 and 2005 (Chigwedere et al., 2008; Nattrass, 2008). Furthermore, belief
in these conspiracy theories is associated with less consistent use of condoms
in the US (Bogart and Thorburn, 2005).
While the diffusion of rumors is not a new phenomenon, its investiga-
tion has recently gained in prominence due to its perceived increase, which
is associated with an increased reliance on virtual platforms for news con-
sumption and communication. For example, studies have shown that in the
2016 US Presidential elections, online social platforms were more likely to
facilitate the spread of “fake news” than mainstream media (Guess, Nagler
and Tucker, 2019; Silverman, 2016; Allcott and Gentzkow, 2017). Similarly,
in a report by Cramer (2018), around 40% of parents stated that they are
regularly exposed to negative messages about vaccinations on social media.
This has prompted demands on policy makers, news providers and on-
line social platforms to counter the diffusion of rumors (Frenkel and Isaac,
2018). Most recently, misinformation relating to the COVID-19 pandemic
has caused responses from various online communication providers, all aim-
ing to suppress its diffusion (Marr, 2020).
However, there is little understanding about why rumors diffuse on social
networks, which makes it difficult to reduce their propagation. In order to
provide informed policy recommendations, it is important to consider indi-
vidual choices and the associated equilibrium effects on the type of content
that circulates. Indeed, rumors appear to diffuse even when proven, scientific,
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information is available that would debunk them (Silverman, 2016); and al-
though exposure to correct information decreases the probability of believing
misinformation (Porter, Wood and Kirby, 2018), it is far from eradicating
such beliefs. In fact, individuals exposed to correct information may never-
theless remain vocal proponents of rumors (Zollo et al., 2015).
To fill this gap, the aim of the present paper is to understand how ru-
mors diffuse by proposing a model in which two distinct messages about the
state of the world (the truth and the rumor) circulate simultaneously when
individuals can debunk the rumor.
In particular, we assume the society is partitioned in groups according to
ideological predisposition with respect to rumors, which defines their bias.
It has been documented on many topics that people who tend to believe
in fake news can clearly be identified in the society and in online social
communities (e.g., Bessi et al. 2016; Samantray and Pin 2019).1 Also, we
assume all individuals are better off if they know the truth. Hence, they have
an interest in debunking the rumor by exerting a costly verification effort.
One’s verification effort is determined by the probability she attaches
to her bias being correct, which in turn depends on the message she hears.
Specifically, upon successful verification, individuals become aware of the true
state of the world and accept it. If verification is unsuccessful, individuals
believe the message in line with their bias, which is the message they think
is more likely, when their bias is sufficiently strong. Thus, the message heard
and the opinion held afterwards do not necessarily coincide.
Individuals communicate their opinion to their neighbors, but they cannot
credibly reveal their bias, nor whether they verified. Socialization is charac-
terized by a certain degree of homophily, which captures the likelihood that
one interacts with people of the same initial bias.
We find that the rumor always survives alongside the truth. Hence, con-
trarily to what an epidemiological model would predict (Prakash et al., 2012),
1A theoretical micro-foundation for this polarization is in Bolletta and Pin (2019).
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false information may become endemic even if it can be debunked and all
individuals seek the truth. Rumors survive unless agents are able and will-
ing to perfectly verify all information that contradicts their bias, which can
happen only if verification costs are zero, which is unlikely even in our digital
era. Rumors do not need the help of malign or irrational agents to thrive.
The truth to rumor ratio depends on the level of verification and the
degree of homophily, and not on other network characteristics nor the com-
munication technology. Hence, new technologies for the consumption and
the diffusion of information affect the relative diffusion of the two opinions
only if they change these parameters. This stresses that an increase in rumor
diffusion cannot be imputed to online social platforms per se.
However, new communication technologies might have indirectly facil-
itated the spread of rumors by congesting communication opportunities.
As communicating becomes cheaper, the opportunity cost of verification in-
creases. This naturally decreases verification, thus benefiting the rumor.
Additionally, new communication technologies might have increased ho-
mophily by offering less constrained meeting opportunities than offline so-
cialization.2 In our model, an increase in homophily implies that individuals
become less confident in the messages they hear, which incentivizes veri-
fication. However, it also implies that individuals receive relatively more
messages in line with their bias, which get verified less. We derive general
conditions under which either of these effects dominates and discuss examples
of verification functions for either case.
Our model delivers interesting insights on how to fight the diffusion of
rumors. Specifically, it highlights that any policy which amounts to a one-
time injection of truthful information, such as a time-limited information
2Existing evidence suggests that online patterns of news consumption are no more
segregated than offline ones (Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2011; Halberstam and Knight, 2016).
The levels of homophily in online communication are however extremely high (see, e.g.,
Zollo et al., 2017), and online platforms appear to lead to more segregated communication
patterns (Halberstam and Knight, 2016), which is the channel on which we focus.
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campaign, is ineffective in reducing the ratio of rumor to truth in the long run.
Instead, policies should focus on lowering verification costs as this incentivizes
individuals to verify information themselves.
Our results are robust to the introduction of stubborn individuals who
never verify information and never change their opinion. Indeed, the pres-
ence of these individuals gives higher incentives to verify so as to completely
offset any negative impact. Ignoring endogenous debunking would lead to
dramatically different conclusions.
Our paper contributes to the recent literature that uses game theory
to understand the diffusion of information in networks.3 Bloch, Demange
and Kranton (2018) find that, when there are partisans who try to diffuse
false information, other individuals filter the diffusion of rumors by blocking
messages coming from parts of the network with many partisans. While their
paper focuses on strategic information transmission, we study debunking of
rumors through costly verification. This introduces a different aspect of
interaction: aggregate verification rates affect the incentives of individuals to
verify. In this context, individuals cannot affect the steady state prevalence
of the opinions, so there is no strategic motive to transmit them.
Our model uses a SIS framework, a class of models introduced to study
the diffusion of viruses.4 Following the seminal work of Kremer (1996), some
papers have studied how strategic decisions on protection or immunization
affect diffusion of a disease (Chen and Toxvaerd, 2014; Goyal and Vigier,
2015; Toxvaerd, 2019; Talama`s and Vohra, 2020; Bizzarri, Panebianco and
Pin, 2020). In particular, Galeotti and Rogers (2013) study the effect of
homophily in a model with two groups. In these papers, protection is a local
3For example, Hagenbach and Koessler (2010) and Galeotti, Ghiglino and Squintani
(2013) study the strategic diffusion of messages using cheap talk. See Foerster (2019) for
a dynamic version of the game.
4SIS stands for Susceptible-Infected-Susceptible as in these models infected individuals
return to the susceptible class on recovery because the disease confers no immunity against
reinfection. In economics, see, e.g., Jackson and Rogers (2007), Lo´pez-Pintado (2008),
Jackson and Yariv (2010) and, for a more mechanical model, Sikder et al. (2020).
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public good.5 In our model, verification of discordant messages is instead
increasing in aggregate verification.6
The novelty of our paper is that we model multiple states, and in par-
ticular, how the diffusion of the rumor (the disease) interacts with that of
the truth. In Prakash et al. (2012), two viruses spread simultaneously on
a network and grant immunity against each other. They find that only the
more contagious virus survives, i.e., rumors would die out. Relatedly, Camp-
bell, Leister and Zenou (2019) and Tabasso (2019) study the simultaneous
diffusion of two types of information that are non-contradictory. While also
in these papers homophily may induce polarization, a denser network favors
the minority message. A new feature of our model is that individuals can dis-
believe a message they hear. This implies that not only rumors survive, but
that both opinions equally share the benefits of increased communication.
More broadly, our paper relates to a recent literature on opinion dynamics
on random graphs. Akbarpour, Malladi and Saberi (2018) and Sadler (2020)
study information cascades, while Campbell (2013) and Carroni, Pin and
Righi (2020) study monopoly pricing when consumers learn about products
via word-of-mouth. In those papers, agents either adopt or not without
the option of external verification, and non-adoption does not create any
externality. In our model, one’s decision depends instead on the level of
(non-)verification in the economy.
We believe we are the first to study the strategic decision of individuals to
verify what they hear when there are several messages diffusing in a network.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Section
3 presents the main analysis. Section 4 discusses the policy implications.
Section 5 presents the model with stubborn agents. Section 6 concludes. All
proofs are in the Appendix.
5Bramoulle´ and Kranton (2007) and Kinateder and Merlino (2017) study public good
games when the entire network of interaction is known.
6This feature also distinguishes our paper from the recent contributions on the role of
costly search on herding behavior (Ali, 2018; Mueller-Frank and Pai, 2016).
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2 The Model
There exists an infinite population of individuals of mass 1, indexed by i,
who are represented as nodes on a network. Time is continuous, indexed
by t. There exist two messages m ∈ {0, 1} that individuals diffuse via word
of mouth when they communicate with the network of their social contacts.
These messages pertain to the state of the world, Φ ∈ {0, 1}. Without loss of
generality, we denote Φ = 0 as the true state of the world, ex-ante unknown
to the individuals. We refer accordingly to m = 0 as the “truth,” and m = 1
as the “rumor”. When individual i tells individual j her opinion transmitting
message m, this reveals to j that there is a debate over the true state of the
world and the set of values that Φ may take.
Individuals. All individuals of type b ∈ {0, 1}, where each type constitutes
half of the population, have k meetings at each period of time t.7
Regarding information, individuals may be in one of two states: either
they are entirely unaware of the debate about the state of the world, in which
case they are in state S (Susceptible), or they may hold an opinion about
which value it takes, in which case they are in state I (Informed).
Someone in state S transitions into state I in a period by hearing message
m during a meeting. At each meeting, communication occurs at rate ν.
Individuals in state I die at rate δ and are replaced with individuals of
the same type in state S. All our results hold also in the limit as δ goes to
zero. Thus, we are able to capture the evolution of rumors which diffuse over
whole lifespans (such as the HIV-AIDS or the vaccination-autism links) as
well as more short-lived rumors that diffuse in a constant population. We
assume that neither ν nor δ are affected by one’s type or opinion.
Individuals’ types are related to their informational bias. When an indi-
7These assumptions ease the exposition. All our results are robust to allowing for a
non-degenerate distribution P (k) of meetings. If the proportion of agents biased in favor
of the truth is greater than one half, then we are able to extend qualitatively most of our
analytical derivations.
6
vidual in state S hears message m from one of her contacts, she decides a
verification effort. An individual’s type determines which opinion she holds
when there is no verification. In this case, an individual of type b is of the
opinion that Φ = b upon receiving message m, irrespective of the identity of
m. This is a simplifying assumption that captures in reduced form the fol-
lowing process. We assume below that individuals use Bayes’ rule to update
their beliefs on how likely it is that Φ = b upon receiving m. Since it is a
corner solution, there exists a high enough prior y that will lead individuals
who do not verify to hold the opinion in line with their type independently
on the message received. Such value of y might be higher than 1/2 for same
values of β; however, we assume y = 1/2 for tractability.8
The degree of homophily in meetings, β, represents instead the meeting
bias. In particular, we assume that a fraction β ∈ [0, 1] of meetings are
with individuals of the same type b, while 1− β are across types. Types are
not observable, but β is common knowledge. For example, in the context
of online social networks, it is natural to assume that by frequenting certain
chat rooms or online groups, users do not know the identity/type of every
specific user, but they have a reasonable estimate about how likely it is that
they communicate with “like-minded” people.
Types do not affect payoffs from holding a specific opinion. All individuals
in state I expect a (present value) lifetime utility of 1 if their opinion coincides
with the true state of the world and 0 otherwise. We set the utility of being
in state S to 0.9 The interpretation is that being informed of the true state
of the world allows individuals to choose correct actions given the state.
Utility and Verification. Individuals who hear m choose how much effort
8We do not model how types originate. Rather, we consider them as broader than the
specific debate regarding Φ and thus unlikely to be affected by it. As an example, types
might be high vs. low trust in modern medicine. Individuals of these two types differ in
their opinions on a variety of issues, of which safety of vaccinations is one.
9Transitioning into and out of this state is not affected by individual choices and there-
fore irrelevant for marginal considerations.
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to exert in verification. Exerting effort α ∈ [0,∞) allows an individual
to determine that Φ = 0 with probability x(α) where x(·) : R+ → [0, 1].
With the complement probability, the result of the verification process is
inconclusive, so that an individual will hold an opinion in line with her bias.
The marginal costs of exerting verification effort are given by c.10
The only assumption that we make on x(·) is that it is concave. This
implies that the function can be discontinuous only in α = 0, that the limits
x ≡ lim
α→0+
x(α) and x¯ ≡ lim
α→∞
x(α) exist and that x(·) is strictly increasing
(and hence invertible). Moreover, the derivative dx(α)/dα does not exist only
in a countable and non-dense set of points. When it exists, it is decreasing
and lim
α→∞
dx(α)/dα = 0. The limit lim
α→0+
dx(α)/dα exists and we call it d¯.
For every point x ∈ [x, x¯] we can define the subderivative (Rockafellar, 1970;
Greenberg and Pierskalla, 1973)
∆(x) =

[
d¯,∞) if x = x{
dx(α)
dα
}
if x(α) = x and dx(α)
dα
exists[
lim
α→x+
dx(α)
dα
, lim
α→x−
dx(α)
dα
]
if x(α) = x and dx(α)
dα
does not exist
{0} if x = x¯ and dx(α)
dα
exists (and is null).
This correspondence is upper hemicontinuous, non-empty, closed, and con-
vex. Moreover it is strictly decreasing and invertible, in the sense that any
d ∈ [0,∞) is such that there is a unique x ∈ [x, x¯] for which d ∈ ∆(x). Let us
call this function g : [0,∞)→ [x, x¯]; g is continuous and weakly decreasing.
A functional form that we will use as an illustrative example is x(α) = 1−
e−α. This function results from the following verification process. Consider
an individual who searches for information, which consists of n realizations
leading to an answer with probability pn per realization. Hence, the search
10Our model can accommodate a non-degenerate distribution of costs of verification.
This would determine if and how much each individual will verify, but it would not qual-
itatively change our results.
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gives at least one answer with probability (1 − pn/n)n. If npn = α as the
number of realizations n goes to infinity and the success of each realization
goes to zero, this probability converges to 1− e−α.11
Another functional form we will discuss is the piece-wise linear case of
x(α) =
{
s · α if α < x¯/s
x¯ if α ≥ x¯/s
with s > 0 and x¯ ∈ (0, 1). This function results from the following verification
process. Consider an individual who searches for information on external
sources, such as Wikipedia. For each unit of effort or time that she invests
in the search, she gets a new piece of information at a rate s. The process
continues until all the available information, denoted by x¯, is collected.
If verification fails or the agent does not verify, while the individual holds
the opinion that Φ = b, she knows that there is a chance that this is incorrect.
She thus forms an expectation of being correct conditional on the message
she heard, Prt(b = Φ|m).
The timeline is as follows. An individual i who hears message m at time t
chooses effort level αit and becomes aware of the true state of the world with
probability x(αit). Having formed her opinion of the true state of the world,
she takes an action ait to match it. The payoff from this action materializes
at the end of her lifetime, which she expects to be in 1/δ periods, with a
present value of 1 if she has correctly matched the true state of the world
and 0 otherwise. While she is alive, the individual communicates to her social
contacts a message in line with her opinion at rate ν.
Our assumption that payoffs materialize at the end of an individual’s life
captures the reality of many rumors for which it is not realistically possible
for individuals to infer the true state of the world (and hence update their
opinion) by taking an action. Examples of such cases include the link between
11Realizations might have multiple answers. In the context of this model this is equiv-
alent to a lower cost of effort in verification.
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AIDS and HIV, or being of the opinion that vaccinations are safe. In these
instances, information is generally received much earlier than any decision—
such as having protected sex or vaccinating your child—is taken. Payoffs
may materialize only a long time after the action has been taken, or, as for
vaccinations, individuals cannot calculate the probability of adverse effects
relying on their own experiences.12 The utility of individual i at time t,
having heard message m and choosing effort αit is then
Uit = x(αit) + (1− x(αit))Prt(b = Φ|m)− cαit. (1)
Verification occurs at rate x(αit). If it fails or there is no verification, one’s
bias is correct with probability Prt(b = Φ|m). The last term represents the
cost of verification. Individual i thus chooses her verification effort such that
g
(
c
1− Prt(b = Φ|m)
)
= x(αit), (2)
where g is the inverse of the subderivative of x. It follows from (2) that
equilibrium verification effort is independent of the identity of i. However,
we allow for the optimal verification effort to depend on the message received.
We denote by αbt the equilibrium effort individuals take in verifying a message
in line with their type, i.e., m = b and by α−bt the equilibrium effort to verify
m 6= b. To simplify the formal exposition, we call ` ≡ x(αb∗) and h ≡ x(α−b∗)
the verification rates of same-type and different-type messages.13
Transmission Process. Individuals in state I communicate a message
in line with their opinion when they meet others. A meeting between two
individuals is described by a link. The associated network is realized every
period. Formally, we model the mean-field approximation of the system,
whereby each agent takes as given overall verification levels and information
12In the case of infinitely lived agents, we may assume instead that payoffs materialize
at time T , after all individuals have become informed and taken their respective actions.
13We show later that in equilibrium it will always be the case that ` ≤ h.
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prevalence as she is infinitesimal among a continuum of individuals.
Denote by ρbm,t(`t, ht) the proportion of type b individuals that hold opin-
ion in line with m at time t.14 Note that ρ01,t(`t, ht) = 0, as individuals of
type b = 0 may only hold opinion 0, irrespective of verification. The overall
prevalence of opinion in line with m in the population at time t is then equal
to ρm,t(`t, ht), and calculated as follows
ρ0,t(`t, ht) =
1
2
(
ρ00,t(`t, ht) + ρ
1
0,t(`t, ht)
)
(3)
ρ1,t(`t, ht) =
1
2
ρ11,t(`t, ht), (4)
With some abuse of notation, we sometimes suppress the dependence on
(`t, ht) and denote the prevalence of opinions ρm,t, for m = {0, 1}.
We assume that the per contact transmission rate, ν, is sufficiently small
that each individual in state S who meets another in state I becomes in-
formed through meeting k neighbors in an independent fashion, so informa-
tion transmits at rate kν. The laws of motion governing the transmission of
the system are:
∂ρ00,t
∂t
=
1
2
(1− ρ00,t)νk
[
βρ00,t + (1− β)(ρ10,t + ρ11,t)
]− 1
2
ρ00,tδ, (5)
∂ρ10,t
∂t
=
1
2
(1− ρ10,t − ρ11,t)νk
[
β
(
htρ
1
0,t + `tρ
1
1,t
)
+ (1− β)htρ00,t
]− 1
2
ρ10,tδ, (6)
∂ρ11,t
∂t
=
1
2
(1− ρ10,t − ρ11,t)νk
[
β
(
(1− ht)ρ10,t + (1− `t)ρ11,t
)
+ (1− β)(1− ht)ρ00,t
]− 1
2
ρ11,tδ,
(7)
These expressions describe the evolution of opinions in line with m = 0
and m = 1 within the two groups b ∈ {0, 1}. Take for example expression
14Under the assumption that k = ki ∀i ∈ N , the proportion of individuals with degree
k who hold opinion in line with m is identical to the overall proportion of individuals who
hold opinion in line with m.
11
(5), which describes how m = 0 evolves in group b = 0. The first term
describes the mass of individuals who start holding opinion Φ = 0 at time t:
The proportion of susceptible individuals of type 0, (1− ρ00,t), which receive
either m, which occurs at rate νk
[
βρ00,t + (1− β)(ρ10,t + ρ11,t)
]
. The second
(negative) term, indicates that a proportion δ of the individuals of type 0 that
are informed revert to state S. Note that for this group, verification rates
are irrelevant. The interpretation of equations (6) and (7) is equivalent.
Equilibrium. We are interested in the equilibrium of the model in the
steady state. In an equilibrium, the profile (αb, α−b) satisfies equation (2) for
both m = b and m 6= b. The model is in steady state if equations (5), (6)
and (7) are equal to zero. An equilibrium is stable if the system defined by
(5), (6) and (7) is asymptotically stable in the equilibrium coordinates.
3 Main Analysis
We now derive the steady state prevalence of truth and rumor in the popula-
tion, taking verification as given. We then solve for equilibrium verification.
3.1 Steady State with Exogenous Verification
We are interested in the steady state of the system, that is, the situation in
which the prevalence of the truth and of the rumor are constant over time.
We remove the time subscript t to indicate the steady state value of variables.
The effects of ν and δ can be summarized by a unique parameter, which
we define as λ = ν/δ and label it as the effective diffusion rate. We denote
by ιb the proportion of type b ∈ {0, 1} individuals in state I (irrespective of
their opinions) with ι = (ι0 + ι1)/2 as overall information prevalence. With
this notation in place, we can state the following.
Remark 1 There always exists a steady state in which the prevalence of both
the truth and the rumor are zero.
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The existence of a zero steady state is a trivial aspect of the SIS model: if no
individual ever transmits an information, nobody can ever become informed.
The more interesting questions are under which conditions one (or more)
positive steady states exist, and which steady states are stable.
Proposition 1 For given verification rates, if λk > 1, there exists a unique
steady state of the economy, which is positive and stable, and with ι0 = ι1 =
ι = 1− 1/(λk). If λk ≤ 1, only the zero steady state is stable.
Thus, in both groups the proportion of informed individuals is the same,
equal to information prevalence in the overall population. This proportion
is as in a standard SIS model. Indeed, as each m informs individuals about
the set of possible states that Φ can take, we can set m ≡ Φ ∈ {0, 1}, and
solve the model as a single-state SIS model with two groups.
While Proposition 1 is important in establishing the steady state pro-
portion of informed individuals, the crucial question is the extent to which
the rumor diffuses. In this regard, it is also interesting to consider how this
relates to the diffusion of the truth. Proposition 2 addresses these questions.
Proposition 2 For any positive and exogenous levels of verification l and h,
there exists a unique positive steady state prevalence for each opinion, ρ0 and
ρ1. This is the unique stable steady state if and only if λk > 1. Furthermore:
i) ρ0 and ρ1 are increasing in the effective diffusion rate λ and in the number
of meetings k;
ii) the truth to rumor ratio ρ0/ρ1 is greater than 1, increasing in both verifi-
cation rates, l and h, and independent of k and λ;
iii) the truth to rumor ratio, ρ0/ρ1, is decreasing in homophily if individuals
verify more a message not in line with their bias, and increasing otherwise.
The proof of Proposition 2 rests on deriving the steady state prevalence of
13
truth and rumor:
ρ0 =
1
2
· 1 + h− 2β(h− `)
1− β(h− `) ι, (8)
ρ1 =
1
2
· 1− h
1− β(h− `)ι. (9)
These equations show that the steady states of opinions inherit uniqueness
and stability from ι. Since for λk ≤ 1, neither opinion is endemic, we focus
in the remainder of the paper on the case λk > 1. Equation (9) highlights
that, unless h = 1—which is too costly given the assumptions on x(·)—both
opinions survive. Thus, rumors survive in the long run even if verification is
possible and all individuals are better off if their opinion is correct.
Equations (8) and (9) show that with zero verification effort, ρ0 = ρ1 =
ι/2, and the truth prevalence increases in any form of verification while rumor
prevalence decreases. Hence, for any positive amount of verification the truth
exhibits a larger prevalence than the rumor.
The insights that Proposition 2 offers into potential relationships be-
tween online social networks and the diffusion of rumors are rich. One factor
through which online social networks allegedly stimulate the diffusion of ru-
mors is the ease with which messages can be communicated, and the number
of people receiving them. Thus, one generally expects them to have increased
k, ν, or both. Proposition 2 shows that our model’s predictions are in line
with this view. However, it stresses that the truth and the rumor equally
benefit from an increase of the ease of communication due to an increase in
the number of meetings k or in the effective diffusion rate λ.
This result has several implications. First, while empirical studies on the
impact of online communication often focus on the diffusion of rumors alone
(e.g., Bessi et al., 2016), a comparison with the diffusion of truthful messages
would be of a greater interest. Second, if rumors have indeed become more
prevalent in relative terms, this cannot be explained by online social networks
increasing communication rates per se. We discuss in Section 4 how ease of
14
communication might have indirect effects on relative rumor prevalence.
The role of homophily is similarly intriguing, as high degrees of homophily
are commonly associated with an increased diffusion of rumors as people are
likely to hear only messages in line with their bias (“echo chambers”). In fact,
in our model the impact of homophily on the diffusion of truth and rumor
depends entirely on how likely individuals are to verify m = b as opposed
to m 6= b. Given verification rates, homophily indeed benefits the rumor
and harms the truth if individuals are more likely to verify messages against
their bias than those aligned with their bias. While such behavior appears
intuitive, it motivates us to study endogenous verification in Section 3.2.
Overall, our results indicate that verification rates of both messages are
the single-most important variables in determining the truth to rumor ratio
in the network, both directly and indirectly through determining the impact
of homophily. In fact, no other variable can affect this ratio in the long run.
3.2 Endogenous Verification
Individuals choose verification according to equation (2). Individuals are
aware of the transmission process; hence, when they first hear a message,
they can calculate the probability that b = Φ conditional on having heard
it. We assume that they perform this calculation using Bayes’ rule, and that
they have unbiased priors of being of type b = Φ of .5.15
Prt(b = Φ|m = b) =
βρ00,t + (1− β)ρ10,t
βρ00,t + (1− β)ρ10,t + βρ11,t
Prt(b = Φ|m 6= b) =
(1− β)ρ11,t
(1− β)ρ11,t + (1− β)ρ00,t + βρ10,t
15Updating is not entirely Bayesian as individuals do not update their beliefs in case they
receive additional messages. This greatly simplifies our analysis. However, this assumption
is not overly restrictive. The only group affected by it are type 1 individuals who did not
successfully verify the first message they heard and hence hold opinion m = 1. Thus, our
results on rumor prevalence are upper bounds with respect to a fully Bayesian model.
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Using (8) and (9), these probabilities in steady state are equal to
Pr(b = Φ|m = b) = β + (1− β)h− β(h− `)
2β + (1− 2β)h− β(h− `) , (10)
Pr(b = Φ|m 6= b) = 1− h
2− h+ β`. (11)
It follows immediately that Pr(b = Φ|m = b) is increasing in verification
of either message, while Pr(b = Φ|m 6= b) is decreasing. Indeed, more
verification implies that more truth circulates, increasing the credibility of
the message received. Hence, more verification implies that an agent’s bias
is more likely to be correct if she hears a message in line with this bias, and
less so if she hears the opposite one.
Furthermore, Pr(b = Φ|m = b) and Pr(b = Φ|m 6= b) are equal if and
only if no verification occurs, when they are both 1/2. In this case, both
opinions are equally prevalent and receiving either message does not allow
individuals to update their beliefs about how likely their bias is correct.
Proposition 3 If x(·) is defined on [0,∞) and is concave, then there exists
an equilibrium of our model.
To characterize the equilibria of our model, we define c = x′(0)β[1−h]/[2β+
(1− 3β)h]. Substituting equations (10) and (11) in equation (2) allows us to
derive the following result regarding equilibrium verification rates.
Proposition 4 In any equilibrium, αb ≤ α−b, with equality if and only if
both are zero. Equilibrium verification is independent of the number of meet-
ings, k, and the effective diffusion rate, λ. Any equilibrium takes one of the
following forms:
i) If c ≥ d¯/2, there is no verification and the truth to rumor ratio is 1.
ii) If c ∈ [c, d¯/2), individuals verify only messages against their bias.
iii) If c < c, in any equilibrium both messages are verified.
Furthermore, c is increasing in homophily, β.
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Finally, the equilibrium is stable if and only if, either it coincides with a zero
steady state and λk ≤ 1, or it is positive and λk > 1.
The intuition behind these results is the following. When verification is
very costly, no message is verified; as a result, there is an equal mass of
individuals holding each of the two opinions. As verification costs decrease,
individuals first verify the message against their bias. Hence, agents of type
1 hearing message 0, disbelief the rumor, whose prevalence decreases, while
type 0 individuals always believe the truth, independently of verification.
When verification costs decrease further, individuals verify both messages,
but they put a higher effort in verifying the one against their bias.
The threshold of verification cost below which both messages are verified
is increasing in homophily. Indeed, when individuals are more likely to meet
people with the same bias, they attach a lower informational content in
hearing a message in line with their bias, thereby triggering more verification.
Finally, Proposition 4 provides conditions for the stability of the endoge-
nous equilibrium that come directly from Proposition 1, as these conditions
are independent from those determining verification.
However, when the verification efforts are endogenous the condition for
stability does not guarantee uniqueness. We present below two simple and
intuitive examples in which uniqueness is also guaranteed. We leave the
mathematical derivations for these examples to the Appendix.
Example 1 (Exponential verification function)
Let x(α) = 1−e−α. In this case ∆(α) is a function for all α > 0, and we have
the simple linear condition g(x) = 1− x. There exists a unique equilibrium.
If c ≥ 1/2, no message is verified. Otherwise,
(i) Individuals always verify messages against their bias.
(ii) Individuals verify messages in line with their bias if and only if β > 0.5.
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(iii) When positive, verification efforts of both messages are strictly increas-
ing in homophily. 
Example 2 (Piece-wise linear verification function)
Consider the piece-wise linear case
x(α) =
{
s · α if α < x¯/s
x¯ if α ≥ x¯/s,
with s > 0 and x¯ ∈ (0, 1). If c < s/2 (which excludes the equilibrium with
` = 0 and h = 0) and if s < c(2−x¯(1−β))
1+βx¯
(which excludes the equilibrium with
` = x¯ and h = x¯), then we have a unique equilibrium in which h = x¯ and
` =
s
c
− 2 + x¯
(
3− s
c
− 1
β
)
. 
3.3 Truth to rumor ratio
The truth to rumor ratio is the fraction of the prevalence of both opinions
among informed individuals. i.e., ρ0/ρ1. As discussed above, Proposition
4 already offers insights into the importance of homophily for the truth to
rumor ratio, stressing that more homophily might trigger people to verify.
We now derive the effect on homophily also within each equilibrium class.
The truth to rumor ratio derives from equations (8) and (9) as follows
ρ0
ρ1
=
1 + h
1− h − 2β
h− `
1− h. (12)
Expression (12) highlights the two opposing effects of homophily on the truth
to rumor ratio. First, there is a direct effect: higher homophily implies a
larger exposure to messages in line with one’s bias, which are verified less.
Hence, keeping verification constant, this tends to decrease the truth to rumor
ratio. The indirect effect instead acts through changes in verification rates.
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An increase in those exerts a positive force on the truth to rumor ratio. The
following allows to better understand these two effects.
Proposition 5 In equilibrium, the truth to rumor ratio ρ0/ρ1 is equal to
1 +
(
2
L
c
− 4
)
β,
where L ≥ 0 is such that g(L) = `. Furthermore, ρ0/ρ1 is decreasing in β if
c ∈ [c, d¯/2], i.e., individuals verify only messages against their bias.
This result shows that the function L, representing the subderivative of the
verification of the message in line with one’s bias, is a sufficient statistic to
study the truth to rumor ratio. While L depends on the verification of both
messages, this result is useful in deriving additional intuitions.
Indeed, the effect of homophily on the truth to rumor ratio is(
2
L
c
− 4
)
+
2β
c
∂L
∂β
. (13)
When only the message against one’s bias is verified, l is constant, and so
is L. This happens when c ∈ (c, d¯/2), i.e., when c > 2L(0). Hence, an
increase in homophily decreases the truth to rumor ratio as long as it does
not increase c so much as to trigger verification of both messages.
If instead both verification rates are positive, the first term of (13) is
always positive. On the contrary, the sign of the second term depends on
∂L/∂β, that is, on how the derivative of l with respect to the verification
effort changes with homophily. While this term cannot be signed in general,
it highlights precisely that homophily has a negative impact on the truth to
rumor ratio whenever verification does not significantly increase as a result
of an increase in homophily.
In fact, while l is increasing and concave in homophily both with an ex-
ponential and piece-wise linear verification function, the effect of homophily
differs in the two examples.
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Example 3 (Effects of homophily on the truth to rumor ratio)
If x(α) = 1 − e−α as in Example 1, the truth to rumor ratio is weakly
increasing in homophily. It is strictly increasing if ` > 0.
If x(·) be piece-wise linear as in Example 2, the truth to rumor ratio is weakly
decreasing in homophily. It is decreasing if ` > 0. 
The intuition behind these conflicting results is the following. In the
piece-wise linear case, as the verification rate of messages against one’s bias
remains fixed, the verification of messages in line with one’s bias will have
to increase more than in the case where both verification rates may adjust.
Therefore, in the former case the positive effect of more verification overcomes
the negative effect of more messages coming from the own group, while this
does not happen in the latter.
Furthermore, whenever the verification function delivers a unique stable
equilibrium as in these two examples, time-limited injections of either mes-
sage can only affect the truth to rumor ratio for a limited amount of time and
not in the long run. Thus, even if we consider endogenous verification choices,
rumors cannot simply be debunked by increasing the prevalence of the truth-
ful message in the network for a limited time (e.g., through an information
campaign). Therefore, in the following section we discuss how changes in
underlying parameters affect the incentives of individuals to verify, such as
the costs of verification.
4 Discussion and Policy Implications
Our paper has been motivated by ongoing demands on policy makers and
online network platforms to fight the spread of rumors. Much of the political
discussion rests on the role that online social networks play in the diffusion
of rumors. In the following, we address the most commonly cited arguments
as to how these platforms are related to the diffusion of rumors.
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4.1 Online Social Platforms Increase Homophily
Online social platforms offer individuals the chance to self-select in more ho-
mogeneous groups along several dimensions than offline communication, as
meeting opportunities are less constrained online. Evidence that commu-
nication patterns are more segregated online than offline is found, e.g., in
Halberstam and Knight (2016) for the case of Twitter. Similarly, Zollo et al.
(2017) find user interaction with Facebook posts to be highly segregated,
with levels that are above the most segregated offline communication net-
works found by Gentzkow and Shapiro (2011). As long as these dimensions
are correlated with views of the world, the widespread use of online social
platforms implies an increase in homophily. This in turn implies that indi-
viduals are more likely to hear messages in line with their views, resulting
in “echo-chambers”. It is usually assumed that this mechanism is one of the
culprits for the increase in the diffusion of rumors in the past decade.
Our preceding analysis make the mechanism behind this logic explicit,
stressing under which conditions it is valid. As meetings are more ho-
mophilous, on the one hand, verification of both messages increase, as in-
dividuals realize that they hear more biased messages; on the other hand,
individuals hear fewer discordant messages, that are verified less. Rumors
thrive when this second effect dominates.
4.2 Online Social Platforms Imply More Communica-
tion
As online social platforms facilitate communication, they are commonly con-
jectured to have led to denser networks or to have increased the transmission
rate of information. Indeed, increases in communication—whether modeled
as increases in k or in λ—increase the measure of informed individuals, but it
does not affect verification rates (Proposition 4).16 At the same time, we have
16In a more general model, the same holds for changes in the degree distribution P (k).
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shown that without such an impact the truth to rumor ratio is unaffected by
changes in these parameters. Therefore, while ease of communication leads
to an absolute increase in rumor prevalence, this in itself does not imply a
relative increase.
It is possible, however, that the costs of verification, c, instead depend
positively on the amount of communication that occurs in the network. Such
congestion/information overload effects occur naturally if we consider veri-
fication costs as time costs, which seems a plausible scenario. In that case,
through increasing communication, online social networks may increase ver-
ification costs and increase rumor prevalence also in relative terms.
To fix ideas, consider individuals to have a fixed time endowment H in
each period, which they can spend on communication (νk), verification (α),
and on independent leisure activities y. Assume that agents obtain utility
u(y) from their leisure activities, where u(·) is a continuous, increasing and
concave function. Its concavity captures the decreasing marginal utility of
private leisure. Agent i’s utility at time t can then be expressed as
Uit = x(αit) + (1− x(αit))Pri(b = Φ|m) + u(H− νk − αit) (14)
and optimal verification effort is chosen again according to equation (2) if
we define c = du/dαi. In this case, any increase in νk increases verification
costs and lowers the equilibrium verification rates. This setup furthermore
implies that marginal costs of verification are increasing and convex in α.17
We conclude that if increased communication creates congestion effects
in verification, online social networks may indeed have increased not only the
absolute but also the relative rumor prevalence.
17Note that agents still verify messages against their bias at a higher rate than those
that confirm their bias. Indeed, if αb = α−b, verification costs for both messages would be
identical but the probability of own bias to be correct is higher when receiving a message
in line with it, a contradiction.
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4.3 Fact Checking to Fight Rumors
The ease with which rumors can be debunked by agents in the network has
been an important aspect in discussions on policy interventions. Many es-
tablished news outlets, such as The New York Times or Le Monde, publish
guides on how to recognize false information, and have introduced newsrooms
where fake news is identified and debunked (Roose, 2018). On various on-
line social platforms, for example Facebook, disputed information may be
“flagged” as such (Maidenberg, 2018) by independent fact checkers.
In our model, any form of fact checking that reduces verification costs un-
ambiguously increases the truth to rumor ratio. It follows that fact checking
has to be designed in such a way that it truly reduces verification costs.
We believe this is not always the case in the methods that have been
proposed. For example, Facebook experimented with assigning “flags” to
posts simply stating that they had been disputed. This practice has been
abandoned in 2017 as it proved less effective to stop the spread of rumors
than expected, with some evidence that it might even have promoted the
spread of such posts. Instead, an alternative was suggested whereby next
to a disputed post a user would see various links to the articles disputing
it (Silverman, 2016). In the context of our model, the earlier policy would
have amounted to nothing more than injecting truthful messages into the
network, and as such would indeed have been expected to be unsuccessful in
the long run. The updated policy instead, by providing links to the sources
of the dispute, can credibly claim to lower verification costs.
Overall, our model corroborates that one of the most intuitive policies
to deter rumors—incentivizing individuals to verify information—is also the
one most likely to succeed as long as it is carefully designed.
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5 Stubborn Individuals
It is possible that the diffusion of rumors in social media is primarily driven by
individuals that diffuse them independently of whether they are confronted
with factual evidence disproving them. We now study the implication of the
existence of such stubborn individuals on the diffusion of messages.
We introduce stubborn individuals as people who never verify, always hold
an opinion in line with their stance and transmit messages accordingly.18
We assume that a fraction γ of individuals of each type are stubborn.
This does not impact the evolution of information in group 0, as both
stubborn and non-stubborn individuals are always of the opinion that Φ = 0.
However, there are fewer individuals of type 1 who may verify any message
they hear. We then derive the following Proposition.
Proposition 6 Assume a fraction γ of the population consists of stubborn
individuals. The prevalence of the truth and the rumor among the remaining
1− γ individuals are unaffected by γ and remain as in the baseline model.
The driving force behind this result is the endogeneity of verification. Indeed,
the existence of stubborn individuals implies that non-stubborn individuals
place a higher probability of being told the rumor. This therefore leads
to a higher degree of verification among them, which offsets the negative
impact that stubborn individuals have on the relative prevalence of truth and
rumor. Formally, in the proof of Proposition 6 we show that the prevalence
of both opinions can be re-written as in the baseline model with verification
rates xˆ(α) = (1 − γ)x(α) instead of the original x(α)’s. This leads to the
equilibrium xˆ(α) being unaffected by stubborn individuals.19
18Alternatively, for all β < 1, we can think of stubborn individuals as having a prior of
1 of being biased towards the true state of the world, thus they never update. If β = 1,
individuals can never meet someone with the opposing bias. Hence, hearing the opposite
message is conclusive proof that one’s bias is wrong, contradicting the certain prior.
19Note that this does not imply that verification efforts α adjust linearly.
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6 Conclusions
In this paper, we model how a correct message and a rumor diffuse in a pop-
ulation of individuals who seek the truth. Individuals verify the correctness
of the messages they hear based on the probability that what they hear is
correct. They are biased in the sense that, if they do not verify, they hold
the opinion that adheres to their view of the world.
We find that the rumor survives for any positive cost of verification.
New communication technologies increase its absolute prevalence, however,
its prevalence relative to the truth depends exclusively on verification and
the degree of homophily in meetings. While verification costs have obvious
effects, the impact of homophily is more nuanced. On the one hand, higher
homophily leads to higher verification rates. On the other, an echo chambers
effect emerges: individuals are more exposed to messages in line with their
bias, which are verified less. The virality of rumors increases when the second
effect dominates.
We employ our results to discuss policies to debunk rumors. Crucially,
while injections of truthful messages are ineffective in debunking the rumor
in the long run, successful policy interventions revolve around incentivizing
individuals to verify. In the light of our model then, new communication
technologies played a role in making rumors more viral only if they increased
homophily in meetings or verification costs—due to, for example, information
overload.
In our model, we assume that there only exist two opposing opinions and
messages. This excludes the possibility that malevolent agents may aim to
decrease the spread of the truth by creating new opposing messages over
time. Similarly, biases may not be fixed but depend on past communication,
as in Bolletta and Pin (2019). The analysis of these phenomena seems a
promising avenue for future research.
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A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. To prove Proposition 1, we first combine equations
(6) and (7) to analyze the evolution of ι1:
∂ι1t
∂t
=
1
2
(1− ι1t )νk
[
βι1t + (1− β)ι0t
]− 1
2
ι1t δ
Define
ϑ0 = βι0 + (1− β)ι1
ϑ1 = βι1 + (1− β)ι0
In steady state, information prevalence in either group then is
ι0 =
λkϑ0
1 + λkϑ0
(A-1)
ι1 =
λkϑ1
1 + λkϑ1
(A-2)
from which it is obvious that there exists one steady state in which ι0 =
ι1 = ι = 1 − 1/(λk). We now show that this steady state is unique. From
equations (A-1) and (A-2), we can show that in any steady state with positive
information prevalence it must be that
ι0
ι1
=
λkϑ0[1 + λkϑ1]
λkϑ1[1 + λkϑ0]
ι0ϑ1[1 + λkϑ0] = ι1ϑ0[1 + λkϑ1]
ι0ϑ1 − ι1ϑ0 = λkϑ0ϑ1[ι1 − ι0]
βι0ι1 + (1− β)ι02 − βι1ι0 − (1− β)ι12 = λkϑ0ϑ1[ι1 − ι0]
(1− β)(ι02 − ι12) = λkϑ0ϑ1[ι1 − ι0]
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If ι1 > ι0, then the RHS of this equation is positive while the LHS is negative,
and vice versa for ι1 < ι0. It can only hold if ι0 = ι1 = ι.
Finally, either both groups have positive information prevalence, or neither.
Deriving the Jacobian of the differential system reveals that both eigenvalues
are negative at the positive steady state if and only if λk > 1. The steady
state of zero information prevalence has instead two negative eigenvalues if
and only if λk < 1. This concludes the proof of Proposition 1. 
Proof of Proposition 2. To derive equations (8) and (9), we employ the
fact that from equation (5), ρ00 = ι
0. By Proposition 1, ι1 = ι0 = 1− 1/(λk).
By plugging in these values into the steady states of equations (6) and (7),
equations (8) and (9) obtain.
Simple derivatives of (8) and (9) show that the prevalence of the truth is
increasing, while the prevalence of the rumor is decreasing, in ` and h. Hence,
the lowest value that ρ0 can take, and the highest value of ρ1, is at ` = h = 0,
when they are both equal to ι. The truth always has at least as high a
prevalence as the rumor. This concludes the proof of Proposition 2. 
Proof of Proposition 3. The conditions for any equilibrium can be written
as conditions on two numbers `, h ∈ [x, x¯] such that
c[2β + (1− 2β)h− β(h− `)]
β(1− h) ∈ ∆(`)
c[2− h+ β`]
1 + β`
∈ ∆(h)
Define G the function from [x, x¯]2 that applies to the left-hand side of the
above two equations a couple (`, h) and then applies function g to both the
solutions. G is a continuous function from [x, x¯]2 to itself. By Brouwer’s
fixed point theorem we have an equilibrium characterized by a couple (`, h)
that is a fixed point of G. This concludes the proof of Proposition 3. 
Proof of Proposition 4. The result that in equilibrium, αb ≤ α−b, with
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equality if and only if both are zero follows directly from the fact that Pr(b =
Φ|m = b) ≥ Pr(b = Φ|m 6= b) and the preceding discussion regarding their
equality at zero verification rates. Substituting the steady state values of
Pr(b = Φ|m = b) and Pr(b = Φ|m 6= b) into equation (2) yields the following
conditions describing equilibrium verification efforts:
` = x(αb) = g
(
c[2β + (1− 2β)h− β(h− `)]
β(1− h)
)
(A-3)
h = x(α−b) = g
(
c[2− h+ β`]
1 + β`
)
. (A-4)
It follows that neither k nor λ affect αb and α−b. Substituting αb = α−b = 0
in equations (A-3) and (A-4) shows that whenever c ≥ d¯/2, there exists
a unique equilibrium, and, in this, individuals exert zero verification efforts.
The results on information prevalence and lack of impact of homophily follow.
For α−b > 0, we need c < d¯/2. By substituting αb = 0, α−b > 0 into equation
(A-3), we find that αb = 0 is an equilibrium at α−b > 0 if and only if
c =
d¯β[1− h]
2β + (1− 3β)h+ βx ≤ c <
d¯
2
,
where c is increasing in β and decreasing in h. When αb = 0, the equilibrium
condition for α−b becomes
h = x(α−b) = g
(c(2− h+ βx)
1 + βx
)
,
i.e., α−b is decreasing in β. Furthermore, in this equilibrium, the truth to
rumor ratio is decreasing in β as long as αb remains null. Hence, the overall
effect of β on c is positive. This means that an increase in homophily may
trigger verification of both messages as for all c < c, any equilibrium consists
of both αb > 0 and α−b > 0. It also implies that at β = 0, there does not
exist an equilibrium in which αb > 0 and α−b > 0.
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Finally, as λ and k do not affect verification rates, stability follows from
Proposition 1. This concludes the proof of Proposition 4. 
Computations for Example 1. If x(α) = 1− e−α, ∂x(α)/∂α = 1− x(α).
If c ≥ 0.5, there is no verification and ∂x(0)/∂α = 1. We first discuss the
stability of the possible steady states. When αb = α−b = 0, equations (A-3)
and/or (A-4) hold with inequality. Local stability is then guaranteed as zero
efforts are best replies even after small deviations. Denote the RHS of (A-3)
and (A-4) by y and z, respectively. When (A-3) and (A-4) hold with equality,
` = 1− y,
h = 1− z.
The corresponding Jacobian matrix is
J =
[
−∂y
∂`
− 1 − ∂y
∂h
− ∂z
∂x(αb)
− ∂z
∂h
− 1
]
with eigenvalues r such that
det(J − r) =
(
− c
1− h − 1− r
)(
− c
1 + βx(αb)
− 1− r
)
+
+
c(1− h)
(1 + βx(αb))2
c[1− β(1− `)]
(1− h)2 .
All eigenvalues are negative and thus all equilibria are stable as
− c
1− h − 1 < 0
− c
1 + βx(αb)
− 1 < 0
c(1− h)
(1 + βx(αb))2
c[1− β(1− `)]
(1− h)2 > 0
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If we solve for ` and h and define E ≡ 3− 2c+ β(3c− 2), we find:
` =
−E +√E2 + 8(1− 2c)(2β − 1)
4β
(A-5)
h =
1− 2c+ β`(1− c)
1− c+ β` (A-6)
We write h as a function of ` as this is more convenient for further derivations.
Since c < 0.5, by equation (A-5) ` is positive if and only if−8(1−2c)(1−2β) >
0, i.e., if β ≥ 0.5, and ` = 0 at β = 0.5. Hence, (A-5) is decreasing in c.
After some algebra, we can write ρ0/ρ1 as
ρ0
ρ1
=
3 + β(2− 5c)−√(1 + 4β(1 + β) + 4c− 6β(1 + 2β)c+ (2− 3β)2c2)
2c
(A-7)
The derivative of its numerator with respect to c is
−5β + −2 + 3β + 6β
2 − (2− 3β)2c√
1 + 4β(1 + β) + 4c− 6β(1 + 2β)c+ (2− 3β)2c2
Since the derivative with respect to c of the second term of this expression
is positive, as it is equal to
8β (6β2 + β − 2)
((2− 3β)2c2 − 6β(2β + 1)c+ 4β(β + 1) + 4c+ 1)3/2
,
let us study the derivative of the numerator of ρ0/ρ1 at c = 0. Then, this
is equal to −1− 2b2 + 1/(1 + 2b), that is negative. Hence, the numerator of
ρ0/ρ1 is decreasing in c. Since the denominator is increasing in c, then ρ0/ρ1
is decreasing in c. 
Computations for Example 2. The piece-wise linear verification function
is the following
x(α) =
{
s · α if α < x¯/s
x¯ if α ≥ x¯/s ,
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with
∆(x) =

[s,∞) if x = 0
{s} if 0 < x < x¯
[0, s] if x = x¯
{0} if x > x¯
It is easy to see that
• if c ≥ s/2, the equilibrium is such that ` = 0 and h = 0;
• if c < s/2 and s ≥ c(2−x¯(1−β))
1+βx¯
, the equilibrium is such that ` = x¯ and
h = x¯.
Note that it is also impossible to get an equilibrium where both ` and h are
in (0, x¯), because if we equalize the left–hand parts of (A-3) and (A-4) and
solve for ` and h, there are never solutions that are both in [0, 1].
So, if c < s/2 and s < c(2−x¯(1−β))
1+βx¯
, there is a unique solution where h = x¯ and
` =
s
c
− 2 + x¯
(
3− s
c
− 1
β
)
.

Proof of Proposition 5. The results follow from the computations in the
proof of Proposition 4. From equations (A-3) and (A-4), there are two non–
negative numbers L ∈ ∆(`) and H ∈ ∆(h) such that
L =
c[2β + (1− 2β)h− β(h− `)]
β(1− h)
H =
c[2− h+ β`]
1 + β`
.
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Inverting these two equations, we obtain
` =
(2− 4β)c2 + (3β − 1)cH + βcL− βHL
β(β(c−H)(3c− L) + c(H − 2c))
h =
β(c−H)(2c− L) + c(H − 2c)
β(c−H)(3c− L) + c(H − 2c) .
If we put these last two expressions into the formula of the truth to rumor
ratio, from (12), then H cancels out and we obtain exactly
ρ0
ρ1
= 1 +
(
2
L
c
− 4
)
β. (A-8)
The results follow from the fact that if L ∈ ∆(`) then g(L) = `. Finally, note
that from (12) the truth to rumor ratio when αb = 0, i.e., l = x, is
ρ0
ρ1
=
1 + h− 2β(h− x)
1− h . (A-9)
Remember from Proposition 4 that α−b is decreasing in β while c is increasing
in β when l = x. Hence the truth to rumor ratio is unambiguously decreasing
in homophily if αb stays at 0. This concludes the proof of Proposition 5. 
Computations for Example 3. From equation (A-8) we have the expres-
sion of the truth to rumor ratio, with respect to some L ∈ ∆(`), but when
x(·) is differentiable in an interior point, then L is just the derivative of x(·)
in the point where it attains the value of `.
In the exponential verification function x(α) = 1 − e−α, if we are in the
corner solution where ` = 0 and h = 0, then the truth to rumor ratio is one
and remains so if β changes marginally. If only ` = 0, then Proposition 5
applies. If instead the equilibrium is interior, then we have the value of `
from expression (A-5). If we plug it into equation (A-8) and we take the
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derivative with respect to β, we get ∂(ρ0/ρ1)/∂β = 2− 5c+D, where
D =
−2− β(2− 3c)2 + 3c+ 6c2
2
√
(1 + 4β(1 + β) + 4c− 6β(1 + 2β)c+ (2− 3β)2c2) .
Note that, if c < .5,
∂D
∂β
=
8c(−2 + c+ 6c2)
2[(1 + 4β(1 + β) + 4c− 6β(1 + 2β)c+ (2− 3β)2c2)] 32 < 0.
So, ∂(ρ0/ρ1)/∂β is strictly decreasing in β and, at β = .5, it is equal to
−4c(1 − 2c)/(4 − c), that is negative for c < .5. This implies that ρ0/ρ1 is
strictly decreasing in β.
In the piece-wise linear, as in Example 2, the corner solutions ` = h = 0
and ` = h = x¯ are again insensitive to marginal changes in β. In an interior
solution where c ≥ s/2 and L = s, the expression of ρ0/ρ1 from (A-8) is
increasing in β since ∂(ρ0/ρ1)/β = −4 + 2s/c, which is strictly positive. 
Proof of Proposition 6. As individuals of type 0 are always of the opinion
that Φ = 0, γ is irrelevant for ρ0,t. We separately consider stubborn and
non-stubborn individuals of type 1. All stubborn individuals of this type
hold opinion Φ = 1 and we denote the corresponding prevalence as ργ1,t. We
denote the prevalence of opinion b among non-stubborn individuals of type 1
as ρ1−γb,t and the proportion of informed non-stubborn (stubborn) individuals
as ι1−γt (ι
γ
t ). As in the benchmark model, ι
0
t = ρ
0
0,t, but now ι
1
t = γι
γ
t + (1−
γ)[ι1−γ0,t + ι
1−γ
1,t ]. The total prevalence of both opinions is
ρ1,t =
1
2
[(1− γ)ρ1−γ1,t + γργ1,t],
ρ0,t =
1
2
[ι0t + (1− γ)ρ1−γ0,t ].
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The system describing the evolution of the prevalence of opinions is
∂ρ00,t
∂t
=
1
2
(1− ρ00,t)νk[βι0t + (1− β)ι1t ]−
1
2
ρ00,tδ (A-10)
∂ργ1,t
∂t
=
1
2
γ(1− ργ1,t)νk[βι1t + (1− β)ι0t ]−
1
2
γργ1,tδ (A-11)
∂ρ1−γ0,t
∂t
=
1
2
(1− γ)[1− ρ1−γ0,t − ρ1−γ1,t ]νk
[
β`[(1− γ)ρ1−γ1,t + γργ1,t]+
+βh(1− γ)ρ1−γ0,t + (1− β)hρ00,t
]− 1
2
(1− γ)ρ1−γ0,t δ (A-12)
∂ρ1−γ1,t
∂t
=
1
2
(1− γ)[1− ρ1−γ0,t − ρ1−γ1,t ]νk
[
β(1− `)[(1− γ)ρ1−γ1,t + γργ1,t]+
+(1− h) (β(1− γ)ρ1−γ0,t + (1− β)ρ00,t)]− 12(1− γ)ρ1−γ1,t δ. (A-13)
By combining equations (A-12) and (A-13), we find that the evolution of
ι1−γt = ρ
1−γ
0,t + ρ
1−γ
1,t mirrors the one of ι
γ
t .
Repeating the analysis of the benchmark model for the model with stubborn
individuals, we find that the steady state values of ρ0 and ρ1 are
ρ0 =
1
2
1 + (1− γ)h+ 2β(1− γ)(`− h)
1 + β(1− γ)(`− h) ι,
ρ1 =
1
2
1− (1− γ)h
1 + β(1− γ)(`− h)ι.
Hence, verification with stubborn individuals is as in the benchmark model
with xˆ(α) = (1 − γ)x(α). The prevalence of both opinions and verification
rates are therefore unchanged. This concludes the proof of Proposition 6. 
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